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mitigate the associated environmental risk.5-8 In some countries this
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HMA often operates in environments where perfection may be
deemed the enemy of good. What is practicable on a military range
in the United Kingdom might not be so in the complex environments
of current HMA operations. Therefore, the task is to develop practical
mitigation methods that have a good chance of being applied, no matter the location. Examples of such methods could range from using an
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traditional munitions. Such contamination is or will be part of HMA’s
environmental impact, and operators are responsible for the contamination that could reasonably have been prevented during clearance
and disposal operations.

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (SAA)
Most SAA contains lead, along with smaller amounts of alloying
material such as antimony. Lead slag is classified as Toxic Solid UN 6.1
(UN ID 3288).19 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Drug Administration states that in “humans and animals,
exposure to lead may cause neurological, reproductive, developmental,
immune, cardiovascular and renal health effects. In general, sensitivity to lead toxicity is greater when there is exposure in utero and in
children compared to adults.”20
The safe disposal of SAA presents a significant ongoing challenge
to HMA clearance operators. The days when SAA was added to bulk
demolitions are hopefully long in the past. Currently, most SAA is
burnt in some way. Open pit burns used to be one technique used, but
this method is guaranteed to introduce lead contamination directly
into the soil. Organizations have developed improvised or bespoke
burning tanks that, if strong enough, are also used to burn the primers
and boosters within fuzes of a certain size. Military organizations have
increasingly used industrial rotary kilns. The capital expenditure these
require has meant they are yet to be deployed in HMA.
Regardless of the method of burning, the slag residue from SAA is
typically buried. This is potentially a significant risk to the environment, especially if done in large quantities. Burial without knowledge of local soil and water course conditions is a practice that should
cease in HMA. Many operators are unaware of the concept of fate and
transport of lead contamination. In simple terms this follows a sourcepathway-receptor (SPR) model, with lead being the source in this
instance. The pathway would be the means by which the contaminant
moves through the environment; by air, soil, or water. The receptor
is the entity that can be adversely affected by the contaminant.21 The
transport depends on contaminant solubility, which in turn is governed by pH and oxidation. Lead is an amphoteric metal that exhibits
its greatest solubility in acidic (pH < 4) and heavily alkaline (pH > 11)
solutions.22 “Lead corrodes and leaches readily in acidic conditions to
concentrations that can exceed guidelines for human health and controlled waters.”23 Despite this risk, no current HMA SOPs are known to
detail even a basic environmental risk assessment prior to the burial of
SAA slag residue, or even possible mitigation measures.

HEAVY METAL TUNGSTEN ALLOYS
The concern over the alleged carcinogenic effects of depleted uranium (DU) since 1991 lead to the development of tungsten alloys as
an alternative for armor piercing ammunition.24 Unfortunately, tungsten alloys have been the cause of increasing concern for those charged
with mitigating the environmental impact on military firing ranges.
Tungsten alloys have been proven to be carcinogenic during animal
testing.25,26 The main risk for HMA staff and civilians who may come
into contact with HMTA are sintered 27 splinters piercing the skin and

An SAA burn pit. The SAA was burnt in an open pit with a simple metal cover. The
slag residue was subsequently buried. This method is hopefully no longer used
by operators. Burying the slag residue from SAA pit burns concentrates the toxic
waste and is potentially a significant pollution risk.
Image © Private.
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case scenario, whether by means of
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ment posing a risk to themselves,

monitor and limit the explosive residue contamination from second

other humans, and animals.

order demolitions?

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
OF TRADITIONAL
EXPLOSIVE FILLS

INSENSITIVE MUNITION EXPLOSIVE
FORMULATIONS

Most high explosive munitions
contain one or both of Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX) or Trinitrotoluene (TNT). Munitions containing
RDX invariably contain a small percentage of cyclotetramethylene-tetranitramine (HMX) and more modern
shaped charges will often have HMX
as the key energetic ingredient. All
three explosives have some degree of
toxicity.30 The nitro aromatic TNT
can undergo degradation to form
the 2,4 Dnitrotoluene (DNT) isomer,
a common biodegradation product
of TNT that displays greater toxicity. DNT can convert haemoglobin
to methaglobin31 at a relatively low
threshold limit of 0.13 mg/L and is therefore listed by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as hazardous waste. 32 DNT is
highly toxic to humans. 33,34
The nitramine RDX has been designated a possible human carcinogen (categorization C) by the EPA. The EPA has set drinking
water advisory limits for TNT, RDX, and HMX. 35,36 TNT and DNT
tend to bind to organic matter in the earth and therefore don’t transport as readily as RDX, which has greater potential as a pollutant of
groundwater. 37
These explosives present a particular issue for HMA operators since
much of the EO destroyed by the sector is by means of second order
detonation, i.e., a donor charge is used to shatter the casing and initiate the main charge by means of sympathetic detonation. Some high
explosive munitions, especially thin-cased mines, may be destroyed by
(Above) An inert cutaway of the new HMTA 40 mm telescopic APFS-DS-T round.
Ammunition containing HMTA, especially WNiCo alloys, pose a hazard to humans
if sintered splinters puncture the skin. Are we training HMA EOD operators to correctly identify and dispose of such ammunition?
Image courtesy of Andrew Duncan.
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Many NATO countries are developing insensitive munitions (IM).
Typically, this development concentrates on the high explosive fill,
with traditional formulations such as Composition B (60 percent TNT,
40 percent RDX), being replaced by formulations containing reduced
vulnerability energetic materials. These will have high thermal stability and will to some degree be resistant to shock. Explosives such as
Nitrotriazolone (NTO) and 2,4-Dinitroanisole (DNAN) are key ingredients for the new US insensitive explosives, IMX-101 and IMX-104,
being fielded for gun artillery and mortars respectively. Both NTO43
and DNAN44 are undergoing further study to assess acute and chronic
toxicity on the environment and humans.45 In terms of residue deposited from IM munitions, recent testing has shown that standard methods of high order for single items of high EO leave significantly more
explosive residue.46,47 For example, PAX-21, an insensitive formulation
of RDX, DNAN, and ammonium perchlorate, can deposit residues of
up to 28 percent of the perchlorate, even during first order detonations.48 Ammonium perchlorate residues are also common at firing
points, and it may therefore be assumed in areas where HMA operators
burn propellant, residues will also be high. The US EPA identifies the
chronic exposure to perchlorate, (even at very low levels), as interfering
with the iodine uptake into the thyroid gland.49

WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN?
The first and main practical step for HMA operators to take is
to ensure that their professional knowledge of explosives remains
current, and to update their procedures accordingly. This requires
developing SOPs detailing how they will minimize the risk of chemical contamination from the disposal of EO including SAA. These
should include direction on the safe disposal of SAA slag residue,
ideally contracted through specialized waste disposal companies.
Since these are invariably not present in many countries, at a minimum, operators should ensure that no slag residue is buried in acidic
soils and should conduct the simple tests to ensure this. (A simple
soil pH testing kit can be purchased for as little as USD$10.) If there
is no other option but to bury SAA slag residue, it should be sealed in
watertight plastic barrels to prevent leaching into the surrounding

a donor charge that is placed on the outer casing will have reduced the confinement before
detonation of the internal explosive occurs.
Alternatively, if the fuze well cannot be utilized,
a shaped charge aimed at the booster is the best
means of minimizing explosive residue. 51,52
Further testing is required to determine if IM
can be effectively destroyed through sympathetic detonation by means of bulk demolition.
For both SAA burning sites and CDS (often
the same location), operators should consider
instituting a soil sampling regime. The time and
the cost might be deemed impractical but ultimately HMA operators need to monitor at-risk
locations in order to manage the potential contamination their disposal activities may create.
In order to mitigate the potential harm from
HMTA, the key action for operators is to ensure
Bulk demolition using binary liquid explosive. How much explosive residue may be deposited by repeat bulk
demolitions at central demolition sites by HMA operators? Are EOD operators aware that such techniques will
need to be adapted for insensitive munitions? Are EOD operators aware of the risks of adding HMTA ammunition to such a demolition?
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.

soil. For destruction of large quantities of SAA associated with a
national stockpile this presents a logistical challenge since large
quantities of barrels will be required.
Large-scale disposal of propellants and pyrotechnics often leaves an
obvious area of contamination on the soil. Most of this contamination
stays on the surface until rainwater washes it into the subsoil. Having
considered the proximity of local water courses, where deemed practical, consideration may be given to the mechanical excavation and
removal of this residue. It can then be treated in the same way as SAA
slag is dealt with. The Canadian military developed a burning table
technique for their artillery units to avoid open burning of excess propellants following live firing exercises50 and it is possible the technique
could be adapted for use in HMA.
In order to mitigate the actual residue deposition from second
order demolition, operators should consider increasing the amount
and quality of donor charge used, especially for repeat bulk demolitions at a CDS. If the fuze well is empty, as might be the case for
destruction of stockpiled ordnance or abandoned explosive ordnance
(AXO), operators are advised to use this for donor charge placement
in order to maximize the chance of a first order detonation. Assuming
some residue is unavoidable, operators should be careful about the

all technical staff can accurately identify EO
containing HMTA, whether it be SAA or a 125
mm long rod penetrator. Such munitions should
not be disposed of through standard OBOD

techniques. HMTA should be handed over to the competent authority
for processing.

CONCLUSION
As research continues, understanding of the actual chemical contamination risk from EO evolves. Even in defense circles, where most
of the funding for this research originates, there is a wide appreciation
that there is plenty more left to learn.53 Nevertheless, those responsible
for mitigating environmental contamination in modern defense organizations are far in advance of HMA on these issues, not least since
they tend to operate within legal frameworks that are becoming ever
more stringent in regard to pollution of the environment.54 Countries
such as Germany and the Netherlands banned domestic use of OBOD
in the 2000s55,56 and elsewhere its use as a demilitarization method is
subject to ever more stringent restrictions.57 OBOD techniques are
“strictly prohibited” within the framework of industrial demilitarization contracts managed by the NATO Support and Procurement
Agency (NSPA), although they are permitted in other contracts.58
HMA operators still have much to do in order to make sure they are
applying all reasonable effort in order to minimize the risk of chemical
contamination from the munitions they clear. HMA is in no position

sites selected for CDS. Again, acidic soil is likely to enable greater

to stop OBOD, and it is in no way appropriate that it should. However,

transport of contaminants and therefore soil at CDS should be tested.

HMA is able to make sure it is done in a way where risks are responsi-

Ideally CDS should be a good distance from water courses and known

bly managed. There are practical measures that can be taken, and these

groundwater locations.

should be integrated into the relevant technical documents, including

Although IM are not yet commonly encountered within HMA,

operator SOPs. Hopefully HMA operators will one day not find them-

operators should understand the impact of their insensitivity dur-

selves in a position where their best intentions of removing EO have

ing disposal. When destroying unfuzed ordnance from stockpiles, a

been undermined by an inadvertent act of pollution that could rea-

donor charge placed in the fuze well should ensure full detonation.

sonably have been avoided. We should actively avoid doing the wrong

This is because the IM requires confinement to fully detonate, and

thing in the wrong place under the wrong conditions. While actual
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A detonation plume from a high explosive ordnance residue test in Alaska. Snow is the perfect medium for measuring the environmental deposition of energetics.
Researchers at the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) used various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with both traditional and
insensitive high explosives fillings.
Image courtesy of Michael Walsh/CRREL.

IMX-104 fill spread after a low-order technique. Second order and low order techniques are prone to leave more residue. Researchers at the CRREL in Alaska have used
various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with insensitive high explosives fillings.
Image courtesy of Michael R. Walsh/CRREL.

explosive hazards have arguably a more immediate significance to the
people we are trying to help, reputational risk to HMA organizations
is real, as of course are the moral and legal risks.
In terms of the environment, it is virtually impossible for HMA
organizations to “do no harm.” Clearing ground of EO, especially
landmines, inevitably has an environmental impact, whether it is vegetation clearance, physical damage to topsoil or contamination of soil
and water by toxic energetics. The key will be to show we are making
“all reasonable effort” to minimize environmental contamination to a
level no more than necessary to remove the immediate blast and fragmentation hazard.
See endnotes page 68
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